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Capital Structure, Risk and Asymmetric Information: Theory and 
Evidence 
 
M. V. Ibrahimo and C. P. Barros 1 
 
Abstract: This paper proposes a principal-agent model between banks and firms with risk and 
asymmetric information. A mixed form of finance to firms is assumed. The capital structure of 
firms is a relevant cause for the final aggregate level of investment in the economy. In the model 
analyzed, there may be a separating equilibrium, which is not economically efficient, because 
aggregate investments fall short of the first-best level. Based on European firm-level data, an 
empirical model is presented which validates the result of the relevance of the capital structure of 
firms. The relative magnitude of equity in the capital structure makes a real difference to the 
profits obtained by firms in the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Both in theoretical and empirical analyses, many scholars have been addressing thoughts to the 
mix of capital structure which could explain a healthy functioning of companies in free market 
economies.2 In the present climate of worldwide economic crisis, the interest in this issue has 
again assumed a vital relevance.3 
Following the groundbreaking article written by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the Modigliani-
Miller theorem formed the basis for modern thinking on capital structure. This basic theorem 
states that, under a competitive, efficient market process, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy 
costs and asymmetric information, the value of a firm is unaltered by the manner in which it is 
financed. In other words, it does not matter if the company capital is funded by issuing stock or 
raising debt from financial institutions. In substance, this theorem proposes what is often called 
                                                           
1 Ibrahimo and Barros both teach at the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, Instituto Superior de Economia 
e Gestão. 
2 A good survey on capital structure is Rizov (2008). In relation to mix form of capital structure, see 
Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000). 
3 On the recent economic crisis and the need for a sound capital structure, see for example Adrian and 
Shin (forthcoming), Koziol and Lawrenz (2009) Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), Soros (2009), Zandi (2008), Shiller (2008), and Allen and Gale 
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the capital structure irrelevance principle. 
Subsequently, by considering corporate taxes in the former model, Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
and Miller (1977) reached the conclusion that debt-leverage is an important way to increase the 
net income of firms, due to fiscal savings. This is clear in their model of valuing a firm through 
the notion of adjusted present value. While it is hard to agree on the exact extent to which the 
results of Modigliani and Miller have shaped the capital markets, the argument used to support 
the expansion of leverage does seem logical. With little doubt, their results can be used to justify 
the near-limitlessness of financial leverage. Recently, in a different setting, under the context of 
asymmetric information, Ibrahimo and Barros (2009b) have developed a study in which a 
similar result is derived. In this paper, the animal spirit behavior of economic agents plays a 
crucial role in determining the high level of debt in free market economies. 
However, Gordon (1989), based on many studies, disputed the Modigliani-Miller capital 
structure theory. For example, the pecking order theory, developed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), asserts that firms perform much better if capital structure is predominantly supported by 
internal funds rather than by external funds. Thus, capital structure does matter for the adequate 
performance of companies. 
Recently, a number of empirical studies carried out in relation to the roles and the efficiency of 
different forms of capital have not proved conclusive. Examples of these studies are: Margaritis 
and Psillaki  (2010)  Yu and Aquino (2008), López-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz (2008), Kim, 
Hesmati and Aoun (2006), Fattouh, Scaramozzino and Harris (2005), Tong and Green (2005), 
and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2002). 
However, as concluded by Ibrahimo and Barros (2009b), we believe that companies have a real 
incentive to become highly debt-leveraged, which explains the credit crunch and the consequent 
present economic crisis. 
Given the tendency of firms towards a high level of leverage, it is logical that the financiers call 
for the need of firms to hold in their balance sheets a minimum level of own capital so as to be 
financed for their investment projects. Theories of optimal financial structure can be derived, 
with the optimal structure depending on the nature of the information problem being faced by 
the principal and agents. However, this outcome would imply the elimination of the problem of 
uncertainty faced by all participants in the financial market. Thus, the constraints imposed by 
banks as to the critical level of own equity of firms makes sense. 
In many theoretical papers, the optimal financial contracts between two parties assume either 
the form of debt, as in de Meza and Webb (1987), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson 
(1987), or the form of equity, as shown by de Meza and Webb in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). As 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(2007). 
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mentioned above, empirical studies are not consistent with regard to the optimality of capital 
structure. 
By fixing a minimum level of the proportion of outside equity, we attempt to determine, in the 
present study, the constrained-optimal level of capital structure and the nature of equilibrium in 
the financial market under the context of asymmetric information. Moreover, as the empirical 
findings remain inconsistent and debatable regarding the different impacts of debt and equity on 
the performance of firms and accordingly on the aggregate level of investment, we test these 
effects with data on 15 European markets over the period 1995-2007, compiled by Worldscope. 
Assuming the framework of de Meza and Webb (1990) and Ibrahimo and Barros (2009a), the 
structure of the model is defined in Section 2. The context is a simple one-period partial 
equilibrium model of investment with informational asymmetries between risk-neutral banks, 
which offer financial contracts, and risk-averse entrepreneurs, who demand funds for their 
projects. 
Section 3 develops the model with a mixed form of financial contracts. With this assumption 
rather than debt finance alone, a non-efficient separating equilibrium is derived. In this 
equilibrium, aggregate investment falls short of the first-best level. The resulting under-
investment (or under-lending) may be seen as a counter-intuitive outcome. However, it must be 
noted that this is one side of a dual-market phenomenon, which affects the real economy, since 
the other side of the duality must be the over-investment (or over-lending) effect in the use of 
funds by financiers for pure speculation in financial products. 
Another central result determined in this section is that the capital structure of firms does matter, 
i.e. the relative magnitude of outside equity makes a real difference to the quantity of aggregate 
investment and thus, to the level of aggregate profits in the real economy. 
Section 4 proposes an empirical study testing the relevance of capital structure, with data on 15 
European markets over the period 1995-2007, compiled by Worldscope. A random profit 
frontier is estimated, which concludes that equity and debt have different impacts and roles in 
the performance of companies. Finally, Section 5 offers a concise discussion of the pertinent 
issues raised and also presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2. A principal-agent model of finance 
The economic environment is a simple one-period partial equilibrium model with 
ex ante asymmetric information between banks and entrepreneurs. The analysis aims to 
determine: (a) the nature of equilibrium; (b) the effects of the capital structure of firms; 
(c) and the causes of market failures. 
The basic assumptions of the model and the behavior of economic participants are 
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defined below. Entrepreneurs' projects differ in terms of their level and nature of risk and the 
problem analyzed is that of financing them by own equity, debt and outside equity. This 
method of financing investors, which is common in the capital markets, is analogous to 
that proposed in the study of de Meza and Webb (1990). The specific notion of risk is taken 
from the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
Let us assume a capital market, in which there are only two classes of economic agents: 
firms or entrepreneurs, who are in need of finance, and banks or financial institutions, 
which make it available. 
Entrepreneurs are risk-averse, expected utility-maximizers, all with an identical 
quasi-concave utility function of end-of-period wealth, U (W). They each have the same 
initial wealth, ,W0 which can be invested either in an indivisible amount of investment, 
K, or in a safe asset, yielding the same interest rate ρ . For the sake of simplicity, it is 
assumed that the deposit is the sole safe asset in the market, so that if projects are not 
carried out, 0W  is deposited with banks. The ith project, if executed, yields a random 
return iR of 
s
iR  if it succeeds and 
f
iR  if it fails. Adaptation of the mean preserving 
spread criterion of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) implies that all projects have a common 
expected return µ : 






ii R)]R(p1[R)R(p , for all i. 
In this equation, pi, defined by [0, 1], is the success probability of the ith project. To 
simplify the model, we assume that ffi RR =  for all i. Projects differ in risk and since pi 
depends on siR , so they differ in successful return. In the present analysis, it is sufficient to 
assume only two categories of entrepreneurs4: high-risk individuals with success probability 




LL > . This 
condition with (1) implies that projects are ranked by the mean preserving spread 
criterion. In what follows the subscript i will denote the entrepreneur's category. 
To cause the need for external finance, it is assumed that W0 < K, so if a project is to be 
carried out, additional funds must be raised. This is done through the issuance of outside 
equity and/or debt securities. Debt security of current value B pays in the successful state a 
sum D = (1 + r)B, in which r is the borrowing loan rate, or else pays the entire project 
return to the bank in the event of bankruptcy. Then, the return on debt is min (D, jR ) and 
the return on equity is max 0) ,DR( j − , where j = s, f. The proportion of inside equity in the 
                                                           
4 The terms entrepreneur and project are used interchangeably.  
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project is 10 ≤α≤ , which is held by the entrepreneur, and the remainder — the outside 
equity — is sold to a bank. For the purchase of debt security, with face value of repayment 
D, and the proportion (1 – α ) of the equity, the bank agrees to pay an amount F. 
Successful states must pay off both entrepreneurs and banks. Therefore, it is reasonable to 






i −+ρ++−α= . 
In the unsuccessful state, he obtains5: 
(3)          )KWF)(1()]0,DR[max(  WW 0
fff
i −+ρ++−α== . 
From the expected utility theorem, the entrepreneur's preferences for income in the two 
states of nature are described by the following function6: 
(4)      )W(U)p1()W(Up)W(EU fi
s
iii −+= , in which i = H, L. 
The entrepreneur of category i will carry out his project if: 
(5) ]W)1[(U)W(EU 0i ρ+≥ . 
A small group of large banks is willing to offer funds. They are assumed to be 
competitive, risk-neutral, expected profit-maximizers. Competition is of Bertrand type in price 
strategies. Banks pay for each unit of deposits a safe interest rate ρ ; other costs of banks are 
ignored. The supply of funds to a bank is assumed to be non-decreasing in the safe rate 
of interest. It is assumed that banks have knowledge of the proportion of each of the 
two categories of entrepreneurs, ]1,0[i ∈λ  with 1HL =λ+λ . Moreover, they know the 
success probability pi of each type. However, banks cannot distinguish ex ante the 
characteristics of each entrepreneur's project. This assumption introduces the key asymmetry 
of information into the model. Once finance is made available, the financial contract specifies 
its terms F, α  and D. With this contract offered to an entrepreneur of category i, in the 
successful state the bank makes a profit of: 
(6) F)1()DR)(1(D si
s
Bi ρ+−−α−+=π ,    i = H, L. 
The bank’s profit in the low state is: 
(7)      F)1()0,DRmax()1()R,Dmin( fffB
f
Bi ρ+−−α−+=π=π . 
The value of fR  can be greater or smaller than D. Therefore, the expected profit to the 
                                                           
5 For a given contract, note that ffi
ff
i RR since i, all for,WW == .  
6 Utilities are assumed not to be state-dependent. 
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bank from a project of category i resulting from the financial contract offered: 
(8) fBi
s
BiiBi )p1(p)(E π−+π=π . 
Note that )R(pp siii = . 
In the present model, collusion between banks is ruled out and each entrepreneur can 
only carry out one project. 
The following definition is now established: 
Definition 1: Equilibrium in the competitive capital market is specified by a set of 
financial contracts, such that all contracts in the equilibrium set generate a zero 
expected profit to banks; and there exists no other contract in the exterior of the 
equilibrium set, which - if offered - yields a non-negative expected profit. 
Definition 1 means that there is a Bertrand competition between banks. In other words, 
each bank expects that the rivals will maintain the terms of financial contracts invariable, 
in spite of its own decisions. 
Next, we develop the model under the constrained-mixed form of finance and the properties 
of the market equilibrium are then examined. 
 
3. Financial equilibrium in a model of the mixed form of finance 
The theory of financial markets with asymmetric information, with few exceptions, treats debt 
and equity as extreme, alternative means of finance. This is so because optimal 
contracts are derived under very restrictive assumptions. On this matter, it seems that 
the theory of the capital structure of modern corporations uses an approach more consistent 
with the real world. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that in entrepreneurial 
firms where the resources of entrepreneurs are limited, projects are not in general 
exclusively funded by means of just one source of finance. In this study, it is illustrated that an 
optimal combination of debt and equity can be obtained if the effects of adverse 
incentives - from issuing new equity - and risk distortions - from issuing debt - are 
equalised at the margin. An analogous point of view is advanced by Williamson 
(1988). Thus, it seems constructive to study the effects of a mixed form of finance of the capital 
needed by firms for their entrepreneurial projects. 
Accordingly, we presume a particular combination of debt and equity. In all financial contracts 
offered, let α  be fixed and greater than φ = [– fW  + µ  + (1 + ρ ) (W0 – K)] / ( µ  – fR ), 
i.e. α  = α > ϕ . This constraint is not implausible and allows a clearer comparison with the 
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model. As in this study, if α  > ϕ , riskier projects yield a lower 
expected profit for banks. In addition, let Dmax be the maximum amount of debt allowed for 
both categories of entrepreneurs. The assumptions of the model indicate that if finance is made 
available, D ≤ Dmax < sLR <
s
HR . Let us also consider that 0 < 
fR < D. Now, for a given 
contract (F*, α *, D*), equations (2) and (3) become: 
(9 )  siW = α  (
s
iR  -  D+ ( 1  + ρ ) (F+W 0 -  K), 
(10)                                 fiW = 
fW  = (1 + ρ  ) (F+ W 0 -  K) 
Equations (6) and (7) become: 
(11)                                       sBiπ = D + (1 – α ) (
s
iR  – D) – (1 + ρ ) F, 
(12)                                    fBiπ = 
f
Bπ = 
fR  – (1 + ρ ) F. 
In equilibrium, equation (8) must be equal to zero, for a separating equilibrium if i = H, L, 
and for a pooling equilibrium if i = A. Using equations (9), (10), (11) and (12) in the 
zero expected profit condition, the mathematical function for the offer curves is obtained in 
(F, D) space: 
(13)         D = [ )1( ρ+  / pi α ] F+ siR  – µ /pi α . 
In this equation, the measure of slope is (1 + ρ )/piα, which is clearly steeper for the 
riskier category of entrepreneurs. If p i = p A = λ L pL+ (1 – λ L) pH and siR =
s
AR , equation 
(13) describes the pooling offer curve. 
Indifference curves of entrepreneurs are obtained by substituting equations (9) and (10) for siW  
and fW  into equation (4): 
(14) p i U [ α  ( SiR -D) + (1 + ρ ) (F +W0 –K)]+ 
  + (1 +pi) U [(1 + ρ ) (F+ W0 – K)] = u . 
In this functional relationship, u  is a constant and denotes a utility level. It can 
easily be shown that these curves are concave and steeper, at any geometric point, for the 
riskier projects. Furthermore, indifference curves of each category are steeper, at any 
geometric contract-point, than the banks’ respective increasing offer line  
Now, equilibrium in the model with asymmetric information is exposed. The next definition 
is advanced. 
Definition 2: Let Hv  and Lv be contracts selected by the high- and low-risk entrepreneurs, 
respectively. If they involve equilibrium and cannot be displaced by any other contract on offer, 
then Hv  and Lv are said to be dominant contracts. 
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This definition requires an incentive-compatibility relationship between banks and 
entrepreneurs. With LH vv = , equilibrium will be settled through a pooling contract, and with 
LH vv ≠  through a pair of separating contracts. 
Taking into account Definition 2 and with very restrictive assumptions, pooling equilibrium 
may exist. Nevertheless, under plausible conditions, equilibrium, if it exists, must be settled 
through a pair of separating contracts. These results are shown by Ibrahimo and Barros (2009a). 
We now discuss the welfare properties of the equilibrium and the consequent policy 
implications. Some models of the credit market show that - from a production point of view - 
separating equilibrium involves the first-best solution (e.g. de Meza and Webb, 1990; Bester, 
1985). However, diverging from this result, the following proposition is established. 
Proposition 1: With plausible assumptions such that α = α  > ϕ  and µ=µi  for all i, at 
the competitive separating equilibrium, aggregate investment is below its respective socially 
efficient level. 
The proof of this is rather complex and is offered in the study of Ibrahimo (1993). 
The particular case of the market considered here exhibits in equilibrium an efficiency 
problem. As in the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, there is a negative externality of high-risk 
categories on low-risk categories. The externality is purely dissipative. In other words, utilities 
in social terms are wasted. Comparing with the solution of perfect information, low-risk 
categories are worse off, but high-risk categories are no better off. It is worth mentioning that 
this type of externality - which is due to the nature of asymmetric information - is the main 
cause of inefficiency that arises in the quantity of aggregate investment. In reality, the presence 
of high-risk entrepreneurs in the market induces low-risk entrepreneurs to demand lower 
amounts of debt than they would if information were perfect. With a large number of 
entrepreneurial categories (i.e. not just two categories), since for each category a lower debt 
involves a lower value paid by banks in exchange for bonds, the categories of projects with the 
highest success probabilities become unprofitable from the point of view of entrepreneurs and 
hence are not carried out. Thus, in equilibrium the quantity of aggregate investment falls short 
of the first-best level. 
The under-investment result suggests that a policy aimed at improving efficiency should 
encourage more investment which could be achieved by a subsidy on bank financing. It 
does appear, however, that such a policy must be second-best, since it would not dispose of 
negative externality on low-risk individuals. 
The present section also demonstrates that real economic decisions are not independent of 
the corporate financial structures. Against the conclusions resulting from the Modigliani-Miller 
proposition, it has been shown that the capital structure of firms does matter. Clearly, the 
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relative value of outside equity in the capital structure of firms produces a real difference in 
the level of aggregate investment in equilibrium. 
 
4. An empirical study related to the model 
In order to test the above model, this section uses the profit frontier model of (Berger, Hancock 
and Humphey, 1993; Mester, 1997) to test the relationship between profits and capital structure, 
using the data on 15 European markets over the period 1995-2007, compiled by Worldscope.  
The stochastic frontier model is characterized by the utilization of a two-component error term. 
A symmetric component captures the random variation of the frontier across firms, statistical 
noise, measurement error, and random shocks external to firm control.  The other component is 
a one-sided variable capturing inefficiency relative to the frontier. The stochastic profit frontier 
is written as: 
 





where Rit represents a scalar profit of company i in the t-th period; Xit is a vector of known 
inputs and outputs; β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; the error term vit is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed and represents the effect of random 
shocks (noise). It is independent of uit, which represents technical inefficiencies and is assumed 
to be positive and to follow a N(0, su2) distribution. The disturbance uit is reflected in a half-
normal independent distribution truncated at zero, signifying that the profit of each firm must 
lie on or above its profit frontier, implying that deviations from the frontier are caused by 
factors controlled by the firm’s management. The variance of uit is σu2 (π-2)/π. 
The parameterization of the different elements to the total variation is given as: 
σv2 = σ2 / (1+ λ2) and σu2 = σ2 λ2 / (1+ λ2); where λ = σu / σv , which provides an 
indication of the relative contribution of u and v to εi = ui – vi, since estimation of 
equation 1 yields merely the residualε, rather than u, the latter must be calculated 
indirectly (Greene, 2003). For panel data analysis, Battese and Coelli (1988) used the 
expectation of uit conditioned on the realized value of εit = uit - vit, as an estimator of 
uit. In other words, E[uit|εi]  is the mean productive profit inefficiency for company i at 
time t. However, the inefficiency can also be due to the companies’ heterogeneity, 
which implies the use of a random effects model: 
 (16)                     ititit
´'
i0it Suv+xβ+)w+α(=R  
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where the variables are in logs and wi is a time-invariant specific random term that captures 
individual heterogeneity. ui is the time-varying inefficiency. The sign of the inefficiency term, 
S depends on whether the frontier describes production or cost function. Any heterogeneity is 
either absent or contained in the profit function absorbed in two parameters, first, the time 
invariant wi, which is interpreted as ‘producer profit inefficiency due perhaps to omitted inputs 
and second, in the inefficiency time-varying term u.  
The model is estimated in the following form: 

















Concerning the stochastic specification of the inefficiency term u, the half-normal distribution 
is assumed to be time-variant.  For the likelihood function, we follow the approach proposed 
by Greene (2005), where the conditional density is: 








where Φ is the standard normal distribution and φ is the cumulative distribution function. 
Conditioned on wi, the T observations for company i are independent. 
The log likelihood is computed by simulation (Greene, 2005, equation 31). 
The equation to be estimated is the following: 
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ln R is the natural logarithm of operating profit. A constant term φ is added if the firm reports an 
operating loss. φ is equal to the absolute minimum operating profit plus one, so that the natural 
log is taken of a positive number; 
T is a time trend; 
lnQ is the natural logarithm of firm output (sales or revenues); 
lnPk is the natural logarithm of ith variable input prices (P1-the prices of labor defined as the 
wages divided by the number of equivalent employees), P2-price of capital-premises 
(amortizations divided by fixed assets) and P3-price of other assets (total costs minus 
wages/fixed assets).P3 is used to normalize the function and therefore disappears from Table 1; 
lnZr is the natural logarithm of fixed netput quantities z1-equity: 1-D and z2-debit: D); 
lnRSCi is the natural logarithm of interest expense on debt. It is a proxy for the risk structure of 
capital of each firm; 
Mi is a country dummy; 
εi are identical and independently distributed random variables, which are independent of the µi, 
which are non-negative random variables that are assumed to account for inefficiency; 
α, τ, β, ψ, λ, θ, φ, κ, Ω, ϖ, ρ, and κ are the parameters to be estimated using maximum 
likelihood methods. 
We obtained firm balance-sheet and income statements annual data (n euros and in real prices) 
from Worldscope from 1995-2007. We selected the European countries listed in Table 1. There 
are 20085 observations and the countries used to control the dummy trap are Turkey  and 
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Finland. We exclude firms whose capital decisions may reflect special factors: The financial 
sector (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated enterprises (SIC codes 4000-4999). 
Standard restrictions of linear homogeneity in input prices and symmetry of the second-order 
parameters are imposed on the profit function. Whilst the profit function must be non-increasing 
and convex with regard to the level of fixed input and non-decreasing and concave with regard 
to prices of the variable inputs, these conditions are not imposed, but may be inspected to 
determine whether the cost function is well-behaved at each point within a given data set.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the variables and Table 2 below presents the results. We 
estimate the random stochastic profit frontier model in equation and report the estimated 
parameters in Table 2. For comparison, we report also the parameters derived from a non-
random specification of the profit function. How do we interpret these results?  We can 
conclude that the random frontier model better describes the underlying profit structure of 
European firms the non-random or homogenous frontier model. This result supports claims that 
non-random frontier models fail to disentangle firm-level heterogeneity from inefficiency with 
the implication that inefficiency will be biased. In our models, the estimated lambda from the 
random frontier implies that 25.9% of firms are attributable to inefficiency, whereas the 
comparative figure is 66.3% for the non-random frontier. This means that 40.4% of firms’ costs 
can be explained by heterogeneity within the sample firms. Thus, failing to account for 
heterogeneity in the specification of the profit function will seriously bias estimated efficiencies, 
which has implications for the design of public policy since it is clear that one hat will not fit all. 
Similar conclusions are reached by Greene (2004, 2005b). Further support for the specification 
of the random frontier is drawn from a likelihood test of the goodness-of-fit between the two 
models. Since the likelihood test has a higher chi-square distribution for the random frontier, we 
conclude that the random model better fits the data than the non-random model (see Table 1). 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Generally speaking, the estimated parameters from the non-random and random profit frontiers 
tend to have the same signs, although the magnitude of coefficients and their T-statistics can 
vary. The models appear to be consistent with expectations: profit increases with output, one 
input price, and netput. The estimated parameters on the time trend and its quadratic term 
indicate that the cost of European firms is increasing at a diminishing rate over time. We 
identify one random parameter, which are firm sales or receipts. This implies that the source of 
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heterogeneity between firms operating in Europe between 1995 and 2007 resides in their 
income statement sheet structures, which may be an indication of specialization in production, 
possibly relating to firm size. This result also signifies that European firms are relatively 
homogenous on the other variables.  
Relative to the debt and stock, we verify that both contribute to increased profits, validating the 
Modigliani-Miller hypothesis, but the square term of stock is positive, signifying that it 
increases profits in an increasing rate, while the square term of debt is negative, signifying that 
it increases profit at a decreasing rate.  Moreover, the coefficient of stock is higher than that for 
debt, which is logical given the risk related to debt. Furthermore, the proportion of interest 
expense on debt indicates the level of credit risk assumed by a firm. If the amount of interest 
expenses is high, this may be an indication that a firm has expended too much based on credit. 
This is evidence of skimping behavior which states that companies deliberately choose not to 
expand, but produce excessively risky credit as a direct consequence of their decision. The 
parameter estimates for the non-random frontier show a very large and significant coefficient 
for RSC (-0.532). This suggests that riskier firms with larger proportions of risk credit have 
lower profits, which is evidence of financial stress. Based on these findings, it would be 
reasonable for bank regulators to take corrective action against excessive debt. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that too much debt can be detrimental to enterprises’ profits. 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This paper argues that, contrary to the traditional views, but nevertheless in accordance 
with the standpoints of some researchers as to the relevance of the capital structure of 
modern corporations, there may be a constrained-optimal combination of debt and equity 
for the capital structure of firms. Thus, the present study has developed a principal-agent model 
for the financial market, in which the financial contracts offered by financiers to entrepreneurs 
assume a mixed form of debt and equity. If the proportion of inside equity is relatively 
outsized, the equilibrium, if it exists, may be unique and entails an offering of 
separating contracts to investment projects with different risk categories. A novel result is that 
separating equilibrium generates too little aggregate investment. Therefore, a subsidy on 
bank financing could be Pareto-improving. However, because of negative externalities due to 
the presence of high-risk individuals, it seems that the best a policymaker could hope for 
would be to achieve a second-best allocation of credit. 
The under-lending result achieved could be seen as counter-intuitive. However, it must be noted 
that this is the phenomenon which affects the real-economy. Under this circumstance, there is 
generally an incentive to use the excess money in banks for the purpose of speculation, which 
could explain the over-lending for the purchase of innovative financial products.  
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The empirical work shows that debt may impact negatively on companies’ profits and the 
contribution of stock is higher than debt for higher profits, justifying parsimonious use of debt 
in investment projects. The present financial crisis highlights the depressing role of high levels 
of debt in the capital structure of companies, which in contexts of economic crisis may lead 
firms to bankruptcy. Hence, the present study argues that whilst debt may leverage the stock of 
companies, too much debt is detrimental. 
The fundamental result of our study also corroborates the views of some alternative theories as 
to the importance of the soundness of the capital structure of firms, namely the pecking order 
theory, in which it is argued that, due to the adverse selection problems, firms should prefer 
internal to external finance. However, when outside funds are needed, firms should prefer debt 
to equity, due to the lower information costs associated with debt issues. Under this condition, 
equity is not often issued. These ideas were refined into a key testable prediction by Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999). The financing of deficit should normally be matched dollar-for-dollar 
by a change in the corporate debt. Debt financing does dominate equity financing in magnitude. 
Net equity issues do not track the financing decisions of companies. The underlying view of this 
theory is that financial stress and the consequent economic crisis are most likely the effects of 
the financing decisions of companies. However, it must be noted that the evidence relative to 
this theory is mixed, as argued by Frank and Goyal (2003). 
The general conclusion of the pecking order theory is that debt initially leverages the company’s 
capital, but afterwards may be detrimental for profits and may cause the bankruptcy of the firm. 
Summing up, this proposition is necessarily an essential issue for further empirical research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (in natural logarithms)  
Variable Description Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
OP Natural logarithm of 
operating profit 
-3.987 1.100 -1.417 0.916 










Q1 Logarithm of Sales 0.108 2.721 1.202 0.605 
P1 Price of labor defined as 
wages divided by the 
number of equivalent 
employees 
0.0006 0.698 0.367 0.151 
P2 Price of capital-premises 
defined as amortizations 
divided by fixed assets 
0.0006 0.826 0.385 0.166 










Z2 Logarithm of fixed netput 

















Austria Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.016  
Belgium Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.028  
Denmark Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.037  
France Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.154  
Germany Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.169  
Greece Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.058  
Italy Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.045  
Ireland Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.012  
Netherlands Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.040  
Norway Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.025  
Portugal Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.015  
Spain Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.031  
Sweden Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.065  
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Switzerland Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.048  
UK Dummy variable for the country 0 1 0.257  
 
 




































































































































































































































   
 
 
